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Abstract—Wearable technology allows for consumers to 
record their healthcare data for either personal or clinical use 
via portable devices. As advancements in this technology 
continue to rise, use of these devices has become more 
widespread. In this paper, we examine the significant security 
and privacy features of three health tracker devices: Fitbit, 
Jawbone and Google Glass. We also analyze the devices' 
strength and how the devices communicate via its Bluetooth 
pairing process with mobile devices. We explore possible 
malicious attacks through Bluetooth networking. The 
outcomes of this analysis illustrate how these devices allow 
third parties to access sensitive information, such as the device 
exact location, which causes the potential privacy breach for 
users. We analyze and compare how unauthorized party may 
access the user data and the challenges to secure user data on 
three wearable devices (Fitbit, Jawbone, and Google Glass) 
security vulnerability and attack type. 
Keywords: Fitbit, Jawbone, Google Glass, Security, 
Privacy, Mobile health, Wearable Technology. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wearable health devices are most commonly used for 
health fitness and user health status recording purposes. 
These devices have grown significantly in recent years and 
these wearable devices are normally in fashion wearable 
forms such as watches, glasses, wristbands or jewelry items 
[1]. In 2018, nearly 3.7 billion new Bluetooth enabled 
devices were shipped worldwide to consumers [2]. 
Wearable devices are connected to the cloud server through 
the internet that enables device owners to interact with their 
user records and exchange personal information such as 
heart rate, geolocation and daily eating habit. These 
wearable devices are connected to internet, such as Wi-Fi 
networks, more than ever before which have become part 
of the Internet of Things (loT). In theory, connecting 
devices through loT allows users to control or automate 
digital tasks so that various unexpected user data such as 
habit, daily activities, and location tracking records are 
delivered to third party observers [14]. Wearable devices 
provide less security compared to computing devices 
because of limited bandwidth and processing power [3]. 
Therefore, wearable devices bring new challenges in terms 
of user’s security and privacy that increase to an array of 
possible attacks due to the limitation of its space and 
memory capacity. Fitness devices require pairing with 
smartphones to establish the connection with cloud server 
for data exchanging. The complexity of this 
communication among various paths generates security 
vulnerabilities such as personal information leaking and 
privacy hacking by hackers. Financial loss is possible as 
some fitness wearable devices allow their user to access 
their bank account for quick payment to selected financial 
institute or agency [21]. 
Researchers raise concerns about the security of wearable 
devices. HP labs found that  most of the wearable devices 
are vulnerable to user data security breach because of poor 
security firmware system in devices [24]. In many cases 
researchers point out that firmware update vulnerability is 
the main cause in wearable devices because these devices 
allow attackers to inject malicious codes [25]. At the 
Hack.lu 2015 security conference in Luxembourg [26], a 
researcher reported that PC can be affected through 
malicious code injection when Fitbit devices plugging to 
PC through Bluetooth pairing within 10 seconds.   
The weakness of firmware, the gateway of apps and the 
service of server are the main concern about security and 
privacy leakage of wearable fitness devices. The wearable 
devices build the connection through smartphone apps as a 
gateway to connect web service, the open interface for 
interoperability. Hackers target the weak point of these 
interfaces which has become a security threat for these 
wearable devices [27]. Therefore, the vulnerability such as 
SQL injection and Cross-Site Scripting (CSS) attacks takes 
place through the connection gateway [28]. 
In this paper, we discuss the strength and features of 
wearable devices and present detailed analyses and 
research reviews on user data security and privacy attacks 
that occur due to poor security firmware in wearable 
devices. The goal of the analyses is to understand security 
and privacy on wearable devices and user data transferring. 
We analyze the security and privacy issues of three main 
wearable devices including Fitbit, Jawbone and Google 
Glass, based on various related prior works and research. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses 
related works. Section III describes the security and privacy 
of three wearable devices Fitbit, Jawbone and Google 
Glass. Section IV compares the weakness and provides 
A B M Kamrul Islam Riad, Hossain Shahriar, Chi Zhang
            
               Department of Information Technology




suggestions to secure the devices. Finally, Section V 
concludes the paper and future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Wearable devices can help users monitor their health and 
fitness by tracking data from movements to heart rate and 
even blood pressure. Meanwhile, continued research 
actively focused on privacy and security of these devices. 
Research have been published with the focus on the user 
data security and privacy leakage for wearable devices. In 
2014, Britt Cyr, published the user data security and 
privacy properties analysis of Fitbit devices focusing on the 
security weaknesses between Fitbit Bluetooth devices and 
a smartphone application during traffic synchronizing [4]. 
They found that Fitbit collected data without providing 
device owner’s consent and that MAC address of Fitbit 
devices never changed which enabled correlated attacked 
[11]. Researcher reported that MITM attacks intercepted 
the BTLE credential during device pairing over TLS [4]. A 
follow-up study in 2018 by Matthew [5] analyzed three 
devices; Fitbit, Pebble and Jawbone and found out that all 
three devices exposed their connection forming packet 
when pairing that would enable server vulnerable attack 
because these packets allow an attacker to follow the 
connection after it is initiated [5]. 
In 2016 Ke Wan Ching, performed security analysis of 
wearable devices especially Google Glass that is eye wear 
device and they found the lack of authentication due to 
unsecure PIN system [17]. In addition, Seyedmostafa and 
Zarian[18] revealed that Google Glass can take pictures 
and record videos without the user's consent that breaches 
the user’s privacy. One of the security and privacy concerns 
has been regulated from various research forums, the 
application of mhealth apps that makes an interaction 
between wearable devices and mobile phones to visualize 
the data record of users. In the Data Protection in the EU 
[19], the European Commission emphasizes data 
protection that tracking and monitoring patient’s health 
information such as activities, location visited, and dieting 
habits would be severely vulnerable in future by using 
wearable devices and their applications. Similarly, a report 
[20] discusses user’s data security and confidentiality that 
would be challenged to ensure compliance with HIPPA 
regulation due to wearable health devices vulnerability and 
their data compromising by third parties. Wu (Min Wu, 
2019) identified that even a trustworthy network within the 
organization in terms of the enforced process of data 
encryption and authentication mechanism is vulnerable 
because third parties may gain elevated privileges due to 
secret access key and certification process from users’ 
ends. They suggested that security key agreement and 
distribution among the node in the network could be the 
strong possible authentication process in accordance with 
HIPAA guidelines for privacy and data security [20]. 
A blog of vulnerability of fitness tracker [21] pointed out 
that most wearable fitness trackers need to be initiated as 
build in security mechanism while connecting other 
devices or applications for data collection. The wearable 
devices’ data are stored in a local server without an 
encryption key. The lack of  security mechanism causes the 
devices extremely vulnerable to cybercriminal attacks [21]. 
In this scenario, cybercriminal can inject random step 
computation values into memory and the wearable devices 
would generate this count value to the server as a valid 
encoded frame. 
A group of researchers [22] (University of Toronto) 
investigate Bluetooth privacy, data integrity and 
transmission security of some fitness trackers. They 
discover that all of the wearable trackers have numerous 
user data security and privacy issues. They release the key 
findings of security and privacy leakage in many of the 
fitness trackers except Apple Watch. The Jawbone UP 
application consistently sends out the user’s precise 
geolocation while Bellabeat, Garmin, and Withings 
application failed to use transit-level security that causes 
data visible in transmission level [23]. 
III. ANALYZING WEARABLE HEALTH DEVICE 
A. Analysis of Fitbit  
The Fitbit tracker [6] tracks various user’ activities 
including number of steps walked; sleep pattern and quality 
as well as other personal health measurements such as body 
temperature, pulse rate, food habit, and body weight. Fitbit 
introduced a series of technology on workout tracking such 
as PurePulse, SmartTrack and Sleep Tracking- a 
technology that automatically recognizes users’ exercises 
and record the data through the smartphone app. 
Strengths of Fitbit Devices: SmartTracking activities – 
Fitbit used a simple accelerometer that is called a smart 
algorithm. SmartTrack uses a 3-axis accelerometer to 
identify the intensity and patterns of the user movement and 
determines the type of activities. To collect thousands of 
possible activities accurately, a series of algorithms are 
applied to that data that shaping down all activities as a 
singular exercising in database server [6]. To measure 
heartbeat, a photoplethysmography, a low-cost and simple 
optical technique that can be used to detect blood volume 
changes, is used for PurePulse. Photoplethysmography is a 
light base technology used to measure blood circulation 
and the volume of the blood in the wrist changes. With 
Photoplethysmography, Fitbit uses optical heart rate 
monitor to detect the pulse by shinning a green light 
through the skin to see blood flow. 
Data Security of Fitbit Devices: Data security is one of 
major security vulnerabilities found in many mobile health 
devices. Fitbit continuously adds software patches to 
improve the user data security and privacy for its devices 
[7]. For authentic security purposes the device protects data 
through regular firmware update. However, lack of 
authentication is one of the most vulnerabilities in Fitbit 
devices that generally occurs on trackers side [7] so the 
potential cybercriminal can easily collect the user personal 
data without their consent. 
The University of Edinburgh conducted research on how 
personal information could be stolen from Fitbit divides 
such as the Fitbit One and Fitbit Flex wristband [8]. It was 
found that intercepting messages transmitted between 
cloud server and fitness tracker is possible. This allowed 
researchers to access users ‘personal information that 




Fitbit System Overview: The Fitbit devices are designed 
to rest in data buffer locally on the device and devices are 
worn by the user all day. Data synchronization is 
performed through smartphone applications for Android, 
iOS and desktop. Fitbit devices send the user’s activity to 
the Fitbit cloud server over Wi-Fi or internet connection 
during data synchronizing. During data synchronization, 
the Fitbit application forwards the user’s activity data to 
Fitbit warehouse. User data activities are fetched from 
Fitbit devices during each synchronization. 
In Figure 1, synchronization is formed over Bluetooth 
between Fitbit devices and smartphone or personal 
computer. The BTLE [9] (Bluetooth Low Energy) is used 
for data synchronization between smartphones application 
or personal computers so over internet/Wi-Fi Fitbit Cloud 
service transpires in an encrypted session. 
 
Figure 1: The Fitbit system components that shows the attack 
surface into five medias. 
 
Analyzing Bluetooth Communication: Mobile health 
devices have built-in Bluetooth that permits devices such 
as smartphones, computers, and peripherals to transfer data 
or voice wirelessly over short distance [10]. Bluetooth is 
measured a reasonably protected wireless connection that 
is encoded, stopping casual snooping or eavesdropping 
from other devices in short distance. However, there is 
always security risk involved such as malicious attacks 
through Bluetooth networking by hackers. For instance, 
“bluesnarfing” is the unauthorized access of information 
from a wireless device through a Bluetooth connection,  
while “bluebugging” allows attacks to take over all 
functions of mobile phone [10] 
A research group from Boston University recently has 
discovered a vulnerability in several Bluetooth devices 
including the Fitbit watch that could allow third parties to 
gain sensitive information from the devices such as exact 
locations [11]. The researchers identified that the 
information leak stems from the way different Bluetooth 
devices communicate with one another to establish a 
connection. In pairs of Bluetooth for transmitting 
information between two devices; one device must first 
establish central role in the connection and other device 
play peripheral role [11]. For example, in a pair of 
Bluetooth Fitbit SmartTrack to iPhone, iPhone would play 
the role of central device and Fitbit SmartTrack would be 
the peripheral device that indicates available connection 
where the signals contain the IP address of a mobile device 
and a payload containing data about the connection [11]. 
Fitbit Device Tracking: Since devices originate 
randomized addresses that automatically configure 
periodically, it attempts to improve privacy instead of 
maintaining one permanent address [15]. But it was 
discovered by researchers that the device to be tracked even 
as its random address originates. Random data is a unique 
identifier of the device that is supposed to be changed 
periodically but in that case this identifier doesn’t change 
in sync with the address. In this case, the research team 
found that Fitbit devices lack address changes or 
randomization at all which is considered an extremely 
susceptible to tracking even without the use of a sniffer 
algorithm. [11]. The research further addressed that 
restarting the Fitbit device or draining its battery did not 
change the access address. It indicates that the data could 
be tracked in Fitbit devices if the Fitbit’s access address 
never changes [11]. 
B. Analysis of Jawbone  
Jawbone is a powerful health activity monitor, food and 
sleep tracker device that is wearable on the wrist like Fitbit 
wearable device. Jawbone uses an internal accelerometer 
and algorithm to track users’ day to day activities and 
suggests helpful tips and lifestyle through the 
accompanying Up app [12]. Jawbone UP24 fitness tracker 
had a big upgrade from its original design, with new 
features and resolving some serious first generation issues 
[16]. 
Strength of Jawbone: The Jawbone UP tracker has a 
feature such as a hardware button to save battery from 
drainage while not aiming connection. One of the good 
security features of Jawbone is the Bluetooth activation 
switch that requires user paring pin code to initiate 
communication with smartphone applications. While 
establishing Bluetooth connection, the device starts 
publicizing and penetrating for other peers after pressing 
the button. In this situation, when paired devices are not 
reachable to connect demand devices, the device responds 
to connection requests from other Bluetooth devices. 
Data Security of Jawbone Tracker: As the Bluetooth LE 
connection described, devices should change the Bluetooth 
device MAC address randomly in order to improve the 
privacy instead of maintaining one permanent address [38]. 
But unfortunately, the Jawbone tracker device is found 
absent in this security feature since it uses the same MAC 
address permanently. This causes the potential users data 
security and privacy issues, when the users can be traced 
easily for their precise location and user data could be 
manipulated by the attacker. While using GattTool 
command is one of the ways to write and read the potential 
features of the device, shell script is another way to pretend 
a Denial of Service(DoS) attack for originating connection 
requests and reading the characteristics of the devices. In 
this scenario, if the Jawbone UP tracker is connected to the 
paired device, it does not accept the further connection 
request. 
Jawbone Up Tracker Overview: In [13] Parson’s 
research team found that during the routing use of the 
device application, Jawbone UP trackers passively share 
the user precise current location. It was unclear to the 
researchers what the reason was for this passive location 
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tracking and that the collection of information was not 
linked with some given fitness activities. In general, when 
users open mobile application Jawbone tracker transmit 
longitude and latitude to its servers; these transmissions are 
connected with the predefined user events, such as syncing 
with the device and opening the application. These testing 
described that this geological data has a precision of up to 
fourteen decimal points and it effectively releases the 
fitness device location within a few millimeters. It was 
found that users did not know the location transmission 
occurring when the Jawbone UP users restore his or her 
timeline. The figure below shows the Jawbone UP tracker 
sends a user’s exact location when the user connects with 
smartphone application. 
Figure 2 shows that Jawbone routinely transmits precise 
geolocation information when users open the apps or 
syncing their wearable to their iPhone [13]. The research 
team found that Jawbone UP fitness data transmission 
between mobile application and health devices servers 
were generally secured using HTTPS. However, both 
Android and iOS applications have vulnerability because 
both applications create false generated fitness data for 
their individual account. Although HTTPS is a secure 
communication network between user and server, HTTPS 
does not cover the security and privacy protection from end 
users. 
 
Figure 2: Jawbone Up phone application share user precise 
location while connecting. 
C. Analysis of Google Glass 
Google Glass is the earliest wearable device that boosts the 
growth of wearable technology.  Google Glass is the frame 
of a pair of glasses which is built in a computer eyewear 
device. It affords various structures that users feel very 
comfortable to use it but google glass is only usable for 
enterprise version that means the google glass is not 
available for individual’s usage. However, many concerns 
about users’ data security and privacy issues have 
been   raised from various researchers group that Google 
Glass is not free from vulnerability and it could be 
threatened for client data security and privacy. 
Strength of Google Glass: Google Glass basically 
performs through user voice command [29]. Users can send 
messages without using their hands and it has video and 
camera capabilities that make a difference from other 
wearable fitness devices such as Fitbit and Jawbone. These 
glasses expose numerous distinct useful applications for 
health organization and hospital staffs [30]. Video 
conferences between doctors and medical associates is one 
of the most unique features in Google Glasses [30]. Google 
Glass facilitates a great amount of health cases throughout 
the conference about patient treatment between medical 
professionals and other co-facilitated health organizations. 
Data Security of Google Glass: The connection system of 
Google Glass is content-based image retrieval (CBIR) that 
allows health staff to search accurate information for a 
patient's medical history while consulting with physicians 
and patients [31]. Apart from these facilities Google Glass 
has a major concern about patient data security and privacy 
[31]. Researchers find out Google Glass does not have a 
concrete authentication process to protect the user’s data 
security and privacy due to lack of secure enough PIN 
system [32]. Google Glass privacy threat is significantly 
different from other fitness tracker that relatively uses 
mobile phone and apps to collect user data. Google Glass 
supports eye movement tracking that may cause 
authentication issues [32]. In addition, Sayed Mostafa and 
Zarina [33] revealed that Google Glass is able to capture 
user pictures and has a video recording capability which 
would be an violation of users’ privacy without consent. 
Most significantly, there are numerous factual cases 
reported concerning data security and privacy associated 
with this Google Glass when it was first released.  
A research team [34] exposed a stern security threat on how 
Google Glass interprets QR (Quick Response) codes while 
it snaps a photo back and they found that Google Glass 
could scan a malicious QR code that forces the device to 
connect to a hostile Wi-Fi access point so  man-in-middle 
(MITM) can perform session hijacking or sniffing or 
remotely gain root access to a Glass devices and take 
control without the wearer’s knowledge – Google Glass 
interprets QR(Quick Response) codes while snapping a 
photo back. Moreover, the QR code is not only the way to 
initiate the security breach, the sniffing or session hijacking 
can be performed by man-in-the middle (MITM) attacks 
and such an attack can be implemented without recognizing 
any QR code by Google Glass devices [34]. 
Google Glass Bluetooth Communication: The Google 
Glass Bluetooth pairing is comparatively the same as other 
fitness devices. It is essential to pair Glass to phone or 
tablet via MyGlass app from the Google play store that has 
full use of Bluetooth capabilities [36]. There is a concern 
that Google Glass battery gets drained more quickly while 
connected through Bluetooth rather Wi-Fi connection [37].  
IV. COMPARISON AND SOLUTION 
We analyze the strength of the selected devices, connection 
capabilities, and data storage structure. We also analyze the 
security and privacy concerns for the three selected 
devices. It is found that there are a number of 
vulnerabilities and chances that user data are compromised 
or gained by middle-of-the-man although there are a lot of 
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improvements that have taken place by the device 
manufacturers. The security vulnerabilities and potential 
security attacks on the wearable devices are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 shows that the selected wearable devices are not 
free from common security vulnerability as well as the 
devices have been chosen for analyses having a lack of 
authentication. Without implementing proper security 
authentication, the devices can be accessed by 
unauthorized activities such as eavesdropping, DoS and 
Brute force attacks. Table 1 also shows that Jawbone 
Devices can reveal exact location that users recently 
visited. Thus, DoS attack can be deciphered and third 
parties can easily get access to the device. Similarly, 
Google Glasses are major privacy issues since glasses are 
capable of taking pictures and recording without people's 
knowledge. Therefore, eavesdropping and spyware attack 
can take place. 
Table 1: Comparison of Security Vulnerability and 
Attacks for Fitbit, Jawbone and Google Glass 
 
Data Securing within Mobile Health Devices: Data 
security is a major concern of mHealth devices. Fitness 
tracker are widely adopted and are easy to use. There are 
many concerns about lacking data security in fitness 
devices and it often escalates to the extremely vulnerable 
risks for users [35]. The following is a summary of the 
reasons for lacking data security and privacy in mHealth 
devices: 
1) Lack of testing: Fitness devices are constantly updating 
their features due to market competition so there would be 
possible rushes to release products or the new features to 
the marketplace. As a result, there may be lack of proper 
testing and strong security coding overlook [35]. 
2) Size of the device: Most of the fitness devices are very 
tiny and there is very limited space to create security 
features by adding extra hardware which manufacturers 
would worry about the device weight and user experience. 
3) Cost Down: Due to fierce competition in this market, 
the fitness devices generally cannot priced too high, which 
would be a possible cause for not having sufficient memory 
space and lack-of-quality coding leading to the failure of 
the strengthening of devices security. 
Fitness Tracker’s Secure Communication Model: Built-
in-security mechanism is one of the most important 
features for the user authentication process because it 
generates the secure PIN system. Secure PIN system 
protects unauthorized access in a device or system because 
it tends to store data without encryption. Cyber-attack often 
takes place due to poor security management that causes 
the devices extremely vulnerable. The hacker could control 
every single aspect of the device through initial injection 
that calls firmware attack which allows attackers’ access to 
local data storage. After a successful firmware attack, the 
devices are open for modification, encrypted key or 
Bluetooth functionality. As a result, attackers could send or 
inject random value into memory as a step count to the 
server as a valid encrypted frames [35]. 
Suggestions to add Security to Fitness Trackers: The 
following initiative and practice help cover the minimal 
security and privacy of fitness trackers: 
1) Regular firmware needs to be updated or developed for 
all fitness devices. Gadget LE privacy and changes of MAC 
address should be required at randomly periodical times, 
such every ten minutes. 
2)While a wearable device pairing with mobile phone, the 
wearable firmware should include fixed and private 
Identity Resolving Key (IRK).  
3) In general, wearable firmware MAC addresses are 
permanent that cause theft of localhost address. But if the 
wearable firmware randomly generates new MAC 
addresses every 10 minutes on IRK, hackers would not be 
able to identify the host address number [13].  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In this survey paper, we analyzed three smart health 
devices, Fitbit, Jawbone and Google Glass and  
summarized the security vulnerability found in prior 
research. User data on these devices could be compromised 
through Bluetooth connection to mobile applications that 
push and pull data from cloud server. Communication 
between server and app is found secure but MAC address 
could cause a significant data leak from devices. While all 
three devices provide a reasonable level of privacy and data 
security overall, the prior research calls for a concrete and 
secure data rest on server for those health devices as this 
would provide more user data security and privacy.  
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